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The Scope of Descartes's Reason

Keishi Matsue

Introduction

In this paper, I discuss the problems of Descartes's 'reason'. Particularly, I will consider what his definition of reason is. First, I confirm what Descartes says about reason in his *Discourse on Method* (1637). For Descartes, 'reason' is the ability to judge correctly, and to distinguish the true from the false. Descartes uses 'reason' to pursue the truth, and to proceed in this search, it is important for him to establish the 'method', 'rules', and 'criterion' by which to distinguish the true from the false. In section 2 and after, I consider them one by one, and examine critically the extent to which the attempt of his pursuit of truth through 'reason' has been achieved.

1. 'Good sense' or 'reason'

As you may know, in the beginning of *Discourse on Method*, Descartes talks about so-called 'good sense (bon sense)'. So, 'good sense is the best distributed thing in the world' (AT, VI, 1; CSM, I, 111).⁽ⁱ⁾ Descartes also says that, 'the power of judging well and of distinguishing the true from the false – which is what we properly call 'good sense' or 'reason' – is naturally equal in all men' (AT, VI, 2; CSM, I, 111). As you can see, for Descartes, 'good sense' or 'reason' is the ability to judge between the true and the false, and he regards this ability as the only thing that distinguishes a human being from other animals (ibid.). He also states clearly that he formed the method and used it to pursue the truth (AT, VI, 3; CSM, I, 112). Then he explains in detail how he guided his own reason.

Firstly, why was Descartes particular about this method. In his youth, he studied in La Flèche, which boasted one of the most famous schools in Europe at the time. While in La Flèche, he studied the humanities (logic, rhetoric, grammar, etc.), and traditional Aristotelian doctrines concerning physics, metaphysics, and philosophy. However, in the first part of *Discourse*, he confesses that he was not satisfied with those studies. But regarding mathematics, he became enraptured with the certainty and evidence of it. After he graduated from La Flèche, he went on to the University of Poitiers and studied law and medicine.

After finishing those studies, Descartes entirely abandoned the study of letters, 'resolving to seek no knowledge other than that which could be found in myself or else in the great book of the world' (AT, VI, 9; CSM, I, 115). While he travelled in various provinces and had many experiences, he considered how we should search for truth, and how we should conduct our

studies and thoughts. For example, in part II of *Discourse*, comparing the system of studies to architecture, he finds that something that has been built on a base, and guided by the reason of only one person, is much firmer than something which has been formed by putting various doctrines together that are not based on reliable evidence. To create a firm system of studies, he thought that he could not do better than undertake to get rid of the opinions to which he had hitherto given credence (AT, VI, 13; CSM, I, 117). However, it is very difficult to completely abandon any opinions that we may have already accepted into our minds. Descartes wrote, 'until I had first spent enough time in planning the work I was undertaking and in seeking the true method of attaining the knowledge of everything within my mental capabilities' (AT, VI, 17; CSM, I, 119).

Descartes aimed for the reconstruction of a new system of study, and therefore he thought that his own method was necessary to accomplish this aim. In the 17th century, which is often called 'the century of scientific revolution', a great change occurred in the field of natural science. Descartes greatly contributed to this revolution. This revolution abandoned the framework of traditional Aristotelian physics, thus it was necessary for Descartes (and other philosophers in those days) to establish new physics that accurately grasped this revolution, and new metaphysics that provided a foundation for it. But first, a more correct method was required to establish those new studies, as Descartes seemed to think that the conventional method was insufficient. In part II of *Discourse*, he states that he thought it important to study some logic, some geometrical analysis, and algebra, but also that these studies have defects, and we should search for another new method (AT, VI, 17-8; CSM, I, 119-120). This is why he was attached to the search for method in the early stages of his thought.

It is well known that it is in part II of *Discourse* that those rules or methods are provided concretely to the public. Descartes provides the four rules there, namely 'rule of evidence', 'rule of analysis', 'rule of synthesis', and 'rule of enumeration'.⁽ⁱⁱ⁾ It is the 'rule of evidence' that relates most closely to the 'reason'. This rule is as follows:

The first was never to accept anything as true if I did not have evident knowledge of its truth: that is, carefully to avoid precipitate conclusions and preconceptions, and to include nothing more in my judgements than what presented itself to my mind so clearly and so distinctly that I had no occasion to doubt it. (AT, VI, 18; CSM, I, 120)

Descartes adequately used these four rules to rightly conduct his own reasoning. As a result, he discovered the most certain and indubitable truth in philosophy, '*I think, therefore I am*'. It was upon this saying that he attempted to establish a new system of studies.

2. Descartes's method

In this section, we will confirm what constitutes the 'method' Descartes believed reason should follow in order to establish a new system of studies. It is in *Meditations on First Philosophy*, which we now take as a text as a whole, that Descartes heuristically carries out the reconstruction of metaphysics. In *Meditations*, he discovers in earnest the first principles of metaphysics, which he regards as the root of all studies. It is important to pay attention to his process. In *Meditations*, Descartes uses the word 'analysis' to characterize his method. We can see his descriptions of 'analysis' at the end of the second set of replies in *Meditations*.

To respond to the proposal in the second set of objections, Descartes sets out his arguments at the end of second set of replies, namely, 'Arguments providing the existence of God and the distinction between the soul and the body arranged in geometrical fashion'. Before these arguments, he describes his method: Descartes states that the method of demonstration can be divided into two varieties: the first proceeds by analysis and the second by synthesis. According to Descartes, 'analysis' is as follows: 'Analysis shows the true way by means of which the thing in question was discovered methodically and as it were *a priori*, so that if the reader is willing to follow it and give sufficient attention to all points, he will make the thing his own and understand it just as perfectly as if he had discovered it for himself' (AT, VII, 155; CSM, II, 110). And another method, 'synthesis', is as follows: 'Synthesis, by contrast, employs a directly opposite method where the search is, as it were, *a posteriori* (though the proof itself is often more *a priori* than it is in the analytic method)' (AT, VII, 156; CSM, II, 110-111). After Descartes concisely explains 'analysis' and 'synthesis' in this way, he declares, 'it is analysis which is the best and truest method of instruction, and it was this method alone which I employed in my *Meditations*' (ibid.).

It should be noted here that Descartes uses the words '*a priori*' and '*a posteriori*' in those quotations. What kind of meaning did these words have in the 17th century when Descartes was alive? In those days, the word '*a priori*' generally had the meaning of 'from cause to effect' and the word '*a posteriori*' had that of 'from effect to cause'.⁽ⁱⁱⁱ⁾ However, if we regard these meanings as such, there seems to be an apparent contradiction in the descriptions of *Meditations*. This is because, for example, one of the most typical concrete examples of analysis, methodological doubts, appears to have the directional property of 'from effect to cause'. In addition, the two proofs of the existence of God in the third Meditation, which are also typical concrete examples of Descartes's analysis, seem to proceed from the *idea* of God as the effect to the existence of God as the cause.

How will this problem be solved? It is the fact that Descartes wrote each of the *Meditations* in accordance with 'the order corresponding to one's own perception', and this

provides a hint to solving this problem. In the preface to the reader of *Meditations*, Descartes responds to two objections to the *Discourse* that he regarded as something worth criticizing. The first objection is that 'from the fact that the human mind, when directed towards itself, does not perceive itself to be anything other than a thinking thing, it does not follow that its nature or essence consists only in its being a thinking thing' (AT, VII, 7-8; CSM, II, 7). Descartes responds to this objection as follows:

My answer to this objection is that in that passage it was not my intention to make those exclusions in an order corresponding to the actual truth of the matter (which I was not dealing with at that stage) but merely in an order corresponding to my own perception. So the sense of the passage was that I was aware of nothing at all that I knew belonged to my essence, except that I was a thinking thing, or a thing possessing within itself the faculty of thinking. (AT, VII, 8; CSM, II, 7)

Descartes's response reveals that the arguments in part IV of *Discourse* are not written in accordance with the order that corresponds to the actual truth of the matter, but with the order that corresponds to a person's own perception. In addition to this fact, it is clear that the *Meditations*, in which the arguments about metaphysics become even deeper, are also written in accordance with this same order. If the *Meditations* had been written in accordance with the order corresponding to the actual truth of the matter, the demonstrations would have proceeded from the proof of the existence of God to that of the existence of Cogito, then to that of the existence of corporeal things. However as you know, in the *Meditations*, first of all, methodological doubts are executed, and then the first principle, namely '*Ego sum, ego existo*', is known as completely certain and indubitable thing for Cogito.^(iv) In other words, the demonstrations in the *Meditations* progresses from the proof of the existence of Cogito, to that of the existence of God, and then to that of the existence of corporeal things.

This order, however, is the sequence of the objects that have been analyzed, and the process of analysis is not executed from the previous epistemological (*a priori*) things. Accordingly, it is inferred that the word '*a priori*' is not applied to the process of analysis itself, but rather to the *aim* of that process (namely, the aim that a system of studies should be established on previous epistemological things). In the next section, we will consider the process of methodological doubts, which is a concrete example of analysis.

3. Criteria for 'analysis'

In the previous section, we confirmed that the *Meditations* were written in accordance with the order that corresponds to one's own perception. In this section, we will make clear

what the character of the analysis process is. As discussed in the previous section, there are a few places where the process of analysis takes place. Especially here, we want to take into consideration the process of methodological doubts. We will confirm this process briefly as follows.

In the First Meditation, it is knowledge or opinions from or through the senses that Descartes analyses first. Next, he doubts and rejects them because 'from time to time I have found that the senses deceive, and it is prudent never to trust completely those who have deceived us even once' (AT, VII, 18; CSM, II, 12). In addition to this, he also says, 'there are never any sure signs by means of which being awake can be distinguished from being asleep' (AT, VII, 19; CSM, II, 13). Therefore, he regards the opinions about physical sensation as false, and as an example, he says, 'I am dreaming, and that these particulars – that my eyes are open, that I am moving my head and stretching out my hands – are not true' (ibid.).

Descartes points out that 'physics, astronomy, medicine, and all other disciplines which depend on the study of composite things, are doubtful' (AT, VII, 20; CSM, II, 14). Eventually, he even doubts the truth of mathematical things. He explains this by saying, 'firmly rooted in my mind is the long-standing opinion that there is an omnipotent God who made me the kind of creature that I am' (AT, VII, 21; CSM, II, 14). Based on this opinion, he concludes that it is possible to be deceived even by such definite things as mathematical knowledge. These analyses help us understand the following quote:

I am finally compelled to admit that there is not one of my former beliefs about which a doubt may not properly be raised; and this is not a flippant or ill-considered conclusion, but is based on powerful and well thought-out reason. So in future, I must withhold my assent from these former beliefs just as carefully as I would from obvious falsehood, if I want to discover any certainty. (AT, VII, 21-2; CSM, II, 14-15)

In the Second Meditation, as a result of this process of methodological doubting, it is the first principle of metaphysics, namely '*Ego sum, ego existo*', that is discovered by Cogito. In other words, Descartes finally concludes that 'this proposition, *I am, I exist*, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind' (AT, VII, 25; CSM, II, 17).

However, what is the unique character of the operation of analysis within the process of methodological doubts? That is certainly the criterion on which the process of 'analysis' can be executed. This criterion appears in the beginning of the first Meditation. Descartes says, 'I should hold back my assent from opinions which are not completely certain and indubitable just as carefully as I do from those which are patently false', and he also says, 'for the purpose of rejecting all my opinions, it will be enough if I find in each of them at least some reason for doubt' (AT, VII, 18; CSM, II, 12). So, Descartes adopts this criterion of 'certain and

indubitable' in his operation of analysis not to doubt for doubting's sake, but to discover the first truth of metaphysics. He aimed to obtain the first truth by exhaustively using the power to distinguish the true from the false, and in doing so, analysing his various former opinions or knowledge.

4. Descartes's theory of judgment in the Fourth Meditation

As confirmed in section 3, it is the plan to hold back one's assent from opinions which have an outside chance of being false that Descartes adopts as the first criterion of analysis. Therefore, to carry out this plan, it was essential for him to fully demonstrate his own power of reason to distinguish the true from the false. The so-called 'rule of evidence' mentioned in Part II of *Discourse* seems to be very important to exercise sound judgement.

We should also pay attention to the fact that, in the Third Meditation, so-called 'general rule of evidence' is established. In the beginning of Third Meditation, Descartes states that, in order to proceed in his search for truth, 'I now seem to be able to lay it down as a general rule that whatever I perceive very clearly and distinctly is true' (AT, VII, 35; CSM, II, 24). Descartes adopts this rule, and by using this rule well, he attempts to determine the truth of what he perceives very clearly and distinctly. In relation to this 'general rule of evidence', however, the problem of the 'Cartesian Circle' will inevitably come up, and we will discuss this problem in next section.

In addition to this, how does Descartes define a state of 'being clear and distinct', or the contrary state of 'being confused and obscure'? For example, in section 45 of Part I in *Principles of Philosophy*, Descartes makes brief mention of 'a clear perception' and 'a distinct perception'^(v) (AT, VIII-1, 21-2; CSM, I, 207-208). In section 46, Descartes also writes that 'for example, when someone feels an intense pain, the perception he has of it is indeed very clear, but is not always distinct' (AT, VIII-1, 22; CSM, I, 208). 'For people commonly confuse this perception with an obscure judgement they make concerning the nature of something which they think exists in the painful spot and which they suppose to resemble the sensation of pain' (ibid.). If this be the case, why does error in judgement like this occur?

Descartes says in the Fourth Meditation, 'error is not a pure negation, but rather a privation or lack of some knowledge which somehow should be in me' (AT, VII 55; CSM, II, 38). In other words, error like this results from not knowing everything about a given subject. In more detail, the source of my mistakes in judgements must be simply this: 'the scope of the will is wider than that of the intellect; but instead of restricting it within the same limits, I extend its use to matters which I do not understand' (AT, VII, 58; CSM, II, 40). Therefore, in order to use well the power of 'reason', or the intellect, it will be clearly important to have control of the will.

5. Cartesian Circle

In this section, we will discuss the issue of the so-called 'Cartesian Circle' in relation to the general rule of evidence.^(vi) As confirmed in the previous section, at the beginning of the Third Meditation, Descartes adopts the so-called 'general rule of evidence', but at the end of Fifth Meditation, he states the following:

Now, however, I have perceived that God exists, and at the same time I have understood that everything else depends on him, and that he is no deceiver; and I have drawn the conclusion that everything which I clearly and distinctly perceive is of necessary true. (AT, VII, 70; CSM, II, 48)

The description like this has caused the problem of the Cartesian Circle. For the proof of the existence of God in the Third Meditation is executed by using the 'general rule of evidence', but the description at the end of the Fifth Meditation suggests that this rule itself was established after Descartes accomplished that proof. If so, this could mean that there is a contradiction in his arguments, in which case this situation may become a very serious problem for him, who clung to the order in arguments.

This problem was pointed out in several objections to the *Meditations*; and Descartes responded to this in the replies. It is the fourth set of objections by Arnauld that is especially remarkable. In this set, Arnauld arranges this issue as follows: In the proof of the existence of God, we need the first principle and the general rule of evidence. However, according to the description at the end of the Fifth Meditation, 'we are sure that what we clearly and distinctly perceive is true only because God exists' (AT, VII, 214; CSM, II, 150).

Descartes responds to this objection in the fourth set of replies as follows:

To begin with, we are sure that God exists because we attend to the arguments which prove this; but subsequently it is enough for us to remember that we perceived something clearly in order for us to be certain that it is true. This would not be sufficient if we did not know that God exists and is not a deceiver. (AT, VII, 246; CSM, II, 171)

Here, he emphasizes that 'we are sure that God exists because we attend to the arguments which prove this', namely, because we clearly and distinctly perceive the arguments in our presence. Let me take this point into consideration, the following interpretation could result from the above quotation that 'attending' guarantees the certainty of 'clear and distinct knowledge'. In other words, Cogito's faculty of 'attending' distinguishes the things which we

clearly and distinctly perceive in our presence from the things which we have clearly and distinctly perceived, and therefore this Cogito's faculty of 'attending' could accomplish the proof of the existence of God without circularity.^(vii)

This interpretation is based on the following description: 'when I turn to the things themselves which I think I perceive very clearly, I am so convinced by them' (AT, VII, 36; CSM, II, 25). For example, Rodis-Lewis points out that Descartes, in *Meditations*, emphasizes again and again this nature of the human mind concerning 'clear and distinct knowledge' (see, AT, VII, 65, 69; CSM, II, 45, 48), and then she places importance on Cogito's faculty of 'attending', which delimits this presence. According to her, it is this faculty of 'attending' that makes it possible to perceive a sequence of arguments with same mind. When Cogito attends to a sequence of arguments through the faculty of 'attending', Cogito would be persuaded of the truth of these arguments. In this time, the Cogito attending to a sequence of arguments could not consider the possibility of metaphysical doubts.

However, is the certainty of these arguments by using the general rule of evidence ensured by such a nature of the human mind? When Cogito attempts to solve mathematical propositions like ' $2 + 3 = 5$ ', I'm sure that Cogito would clearly and distinctly perceive them and be persuaded of the truth of them. But once Cogito distracts attention from them, and if the supposition that God exists comes into our mind, then these mathematical propositions become exposed to metaphysical doubts. Axioms, or common notions, which seem to be evident by the natural light in the proofs of the existence of God, would be clearly and distinctly perceived by Cogito while attending to them alone. However, these axioms or common notions are evidently different from the first principle, namely '*Ego sum, ego existo*' and cannot be exempt from metaphysical doubts. In addition to this, in order to sufficiently perform the proofs of the existence of God, we should attend not only to the things that we clearly and distinctly perceive, but also to the metaphysical doubts.

If we conform to the criteria for methodological doubts Descartes adopts in the *Meditations*, we should pay close attention to the fact that the things we think we clearly and distinctly perceive may not always be exempt from metaphysical doubts. As previously mentioned, Descartes emphasizes again and again that nature of human mind. But if we strictly execute the process of analysis (namely metaphysical doubts), in other words, we adopt the criterion of not only 'clear and distinct', but also 'certain and indubitable', we could not accept the above interpretation as it is.

6. Logical structure of methodological doubts

In this section, we will consider the logical structure of methodological doubts. The process of methodological doubts is a prime example of the truth-seeking which Descartes

attempted through reason. Herein, we examine how this logical structure could be established. To examine it critically, we invoke the idea of the 'logical space of reasons or of justifying', proposed by Wilfrid Sellars. Sellars's basic idea concerning knowledge (which appears in his famous article, 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind' (1956) (viii)) is that, in order to make some statements or propositions as correct knowledge, we should not only describe the experience, which is the content of statements or propositions, but also characterize it as making an assertion or claim, then endorse that claim: 'In characterizing an episode or a state as that of *knowing*, we are not giving an empirical description of that episode or state; we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says'.^(ix)

Sellars's view of the 'logical space of reasons or of justifying' seems not to be negligible in arguing for what knowledge is. In the light of this view, how could we evaluate in Descartes's case? In fact, in the *Meditations*, Descartes eventually revised the system of various lots of knowledge from mathematical one to sensible one (which is based on the first principle), and connected them to each other.^(x) There seems to be a firm logical space at first sight. However, is this logical space sufficient to hold the process of methodological doubts? We will examine the process of doubting sensory knowledge or opinions below.

Let us inquire into the doubts about the knowledge or opinions derived from the senses which Descartes first analyses. He once recognizes that whatever he has up until now accepted as most true, he has acquired from the senses. However, he doubts and rejects them all because 'from time to time I have found that the senses deceive, and it is prudent never to trust completely those who have deceived us even once' (AT, VII, 18; CSM, II, 12). The point is how the claim that the senses deceive could be justified. For example, let's consider the case that the same thing looks different under different conditions, to which Descartes refers in the Sixth Meditation. (AT, VII, 76; CSM, II, 53)

What should we presuppose in order to assert that same thing looks different under different conditions? We will think about situation (1), in which A looks like x, and situation (2), in which A looks like y. (Of course, it can be assumed that x is not y.) Firstly, it is a fact that this object, A, is what these situations have in common. If object A is not the same, situation (1) and (2) are two distinct cases which have nothing in common, in which case these situations are not proper examples by which to explain the phenomenon of perceptual illusion. Therefore, in situations (1) and (2), a lot of common things must be presupposed. According to Sellars, these things are the totality of knowledge on which the statements about these situations are based. This presupposed knowledge could identify object A, which situation (1) and (2) have in common, and then the difference between x and y could be deemed remarkable. In the example of the Sixth Meditation, the same thing looks different because of the condition of distance (close or far). By recognizing this condition, we can understand that situation (1) and (2) are not two distinct cases, but these situations suggest the phenomenon of

perceptual illusion. And then by examining this condition, we will make the decision that one situation is true, and the other is false.

As we have discussed above, in order to recognize some situations as being phenomena of perceptual illusion, a lot of knowledge must be presupposed. In other words, according to Sellars, we talk about the phenomenon of perceptual illusion in the 'logical space of reasons or of justifying'. However as Descartes does, if we were to doubt and reject all knowledge or opinions obtained from the senses, what will happen? In order to judge some sensory phenomenon to be a perceptual illusion, a lot of various facts and opinions (including some knowledge or opinions about natural science) must be presupposed. It is not necessarily a problem that we recognize a certain sensory fact or opinion as perceptual illusion, then judge it to be false. However, if we regard all sensory knowledge or opinions as false and reject them all, we would reject the 'logical space of reasons or of justifying' itself, in which case we determine a perceptual illusion based-existence. If we would reject this logical space itself, we could not reveal clearly the phenomenon of perceptual illusion that supports the argument for rejecting all sensory knowledge or opinions.

Conclusions

In this paper, I have argued about the purpose of reason in Descartes's philosophy, which, as we first confirmed, is to Descartes the power of judging well and of distinguishing the true from the false. Next, methodological doubts are one of the most typical concrete examples of analysis. In analysis, Descartes judges that things which have a slight possibility of doubt are false, then he examines whether any kind of truth remains after thorough doubting. At last, he reaches the truth, '*I think, therefore I am*'.

In order to discover something previous in 'the order corresponding to one's own perception', he employs methodological doubts. However, in the last section of this paper, we saw that Descartes's logical structure of these methodological doubts has defects. It is a patent fact that, by using his own reason, Descartes could arrive at a metaphysical truth which meets the specific criteria of 'certain and indubitable'. However, we cannot call an argument based on this sort of reasoning a sufficiently valid one: therefore, this fact shows the imperfection in his reasoning. Nevertheless, it's still clear that Descartes's attempt to pursue the truth reveals how far reason can take us.

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- (i) 'AT' references are to Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, *Œuvres de Descartes* (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J.Vrin, 11 vols., 1996). 'CSM' references are to the translation by

John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch, *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes* (2 vols., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

- (ii) In those four rules, the other three rules excluding first one are the followings (AT, VI, 18-9; CSM, I, 120). (a) The second, to divide each of the difficulties I examined into as many parts as possible and as may be required in order to resolve them better. (b) The third, to direct my thoughts in an orderly manner, by beginning with the simplest and most easily known objects in order to ascend little by little, step by step, to knowledge of the most complex, and by supposing some order even among objects that have no natural order of precedence. (c) The last, throughout to make enumerations so complete, and reviews so comprehensive, that I could be sure of leaving nothing out.
- (iii) Sometimes Descartes adopts this idea. In chapter VII of *Le Monde*, He writes as follows. 'Thus those who are able to examine sufficiently the consequences of these truths and of our rules will be able to recognize effects by their causes. To express myself in scholastic terms, they will be able to have *a priori* demonstrations of everything that can be produced in this new world' (AT, XI, 47; CSM, I, 97).
- (iv) As you know, it is Gueroult that was strictly concerned with this order and argued Descartes's philosophy in a systematic manner. Cf. Martial Gueroult, *Descartes selon l'ordre des raisons* (2 vols., Paris: Aubier, 1968(1953)).
- (v) The description about 'a clear perception' and 'a distinct perception' is as follows.

I call a perception 'clear' when it is present and accessible to the attentive mind – just as we say that we see something clearly when it is present to the eye's gaze and stimulates it with a sufficient degree of strength and accessibility. I call a perception 'distinct' if, as well as being clear, it is so sharply separated from all other perceptions that it contains within itself only what it clear. (AT, VIII-1, 22; CSM, I, 207-208)

- (vi) Concerning this problem of the 'Cartesian Circle', a lot of papers have been written, and most of books which systematically argue the thought of Descartes also deal with this problem. Cf. W. Doney (ed.), *Eternal Truths and the Cartesian Circle: A Collection of Studies* (New York & London: Garland Pub., 1987).
- (vii) Cf. G. Rodis-Lewis, *L'Œuvre de Descartes* (2 vols., Paris: Vrin, 1971), vol. 1, Chapitre V, § 6, pp. 261-9.
- (viii) Wilfrid Sellars, 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind', in Herbert Feigl and Michael Scriven (eds.), *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, vol. 1 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956), pp. 253-329.
- (ix) W. Sellars, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind with an Introduction by Richard Rorty and a Study Guide by Robert Brandom* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,

1997), p. 76.

- (x) In the preface of *Principles of Philosophy* in French version, Descartes says about 'philosophy' as follows.

Thus the whole of philosophy is like a tree. The roots are metaphysics, the trunk is physics, and the branches emerging from the trunk are all the other sciences, which may be reduced to three principal ones, namely medicine, mechanics and morals. (AT, IX-2, 14; CSM, I, 186)